Rx for a Nagging Constitutional Headache

F. R. STRONG*

DIAGNOSIS: CONTINUING APPREHENSION OVER SEEMING CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CURTAIL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW THROUGH CONTROL
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Appearance of the Raoul Berger volume on Congress and the
Court' highlights continuing concern among commentators over
Congress' apparent power to strip the Supreme Court, even completely, of its power to resolve constitutional issues, whether raised
below in federal or state courts. The threatening constitutional
provision is the second sentence of the second paragraph of section
2 of article HI. Since Marbury v. Madison 2 the Court's original
jurisdiction is free of either Congressional contraction or extension.
But "in all other cases" within the Federal judicial power as defined in the first paragraph of section 2, "the Supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as Congress shall make."3
While the question has been at issue for a hundred years, follow* Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor, The University of North
Carolina; Dean and Professor of Law Emeritus, The Ohio State Uni-

versity.

1. R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SuPREE CoURT (1969).
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2. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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ing the Court's ruling in Ex parte McCardle,4 major recent apprehension is a matter of the period since World War II. Speaking
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in late
1948, former Justice Roberts cited several Achilles' heels in the
Constitution, the most serious of which he deemed to be Congressional power to set aside the Court's appellate jurisdiction.5
Shortly thereafter, Harrison Tweed, a noted member of the association before which the former Justice had spoken, devoted lectures at Boston University to "Provisions of the Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court of the United States," including the
exceptions-regulations clause." Then came Professor Henry Hart's
celebrated article,7 to be followed shortly by a study at the hands
of Professor Lenoir.8 Professor Lenard Ratner took a turn with
the question just a decade ago; 9 and two years thereafter Professor
Merry, a political scientist, examined the matter.10 In the mid1960's Professor Herbert Wechsler gave the issue his attention, 1'
and during 1968 it was extensively ventilated in the Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary
3
Committee.' 2 Now has come the detailed Berger study.'
Roberts and Tweed were both of opinion that Congress clearly
4. 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 506 (1869).
5. Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949) (hereinafter cited as Roberts], reprinted in
Hearings,infra note 12, at 654-58.

6. Tweed, Provisions of the Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court
of the United States, 31 BOSTON U.L. REV. 1 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Tweed].

7. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts; An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Hart].

8. Lenoir, Congressional Control Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 5 U. KANS. L. REV. 16 (1956).

9. Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Ratner].
10. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Merry].
11. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLum. L. REv. 1001
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler].
12. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11-14, 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
13. Since appearance of the Berger volume, Professor Forkosch has written on the topic. Forkosch, Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article
III, 72 W. VA. L. REV. 238 (1970).

possesses the power at least to a degree to control the course of
constitutional adjudication. As the latter put it,' 4
Most people, including many lawyers, would think that there is
not much to discuss and that the Constitution clearly gives the Supreme Court absolute jurisdiction to invalidate an act of Congress
or of a state legislature as unconstitutional. There are comparatively few who recognize that under the express words of the Constitution and a flat decision of the Supreme Court [citing McCardie] Congress can largely, if not entirely, deprive the Court of this
jurisdiction.
Roberts urged the adoption of a curative amendment to protect the
Court, 15 and in this had the support not only of the Association of
the Bar but also of the New York State and the American Bar Associations. Mr. Tweed must have been sympathetic to the proposal for amendment, although "in the free intellectual air" in
which he spoke at Boston University, he but summarized the arguments for and against it without "attempting to persuade or even
express an opinion one way or the other." The Lenoir analysis
found full Congressional power, without particular reference to
the much mooted proviso for exceptions and regulations. Sufficient for him was the Court-approved view that, despite the seeming thrust of the Constitutional wording and the contentions of Mr.
Justice Story, federal jurisdiction derives from Congressional action within the framework of the Constitution and not from the
Constitution alone.
On the other hand, Professors Hart, Merry, and Ratner, together
with several witnesses at the 1968 Hearings,' 0 do not concede to
Congress anything like full power to withhold appellate jurisdiction for constitutional review. The well-known dialogue in the
Hart "exercise in dialectic" commences with consideration of McCardle'sreach, which the questioner reads as holding "that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is entirely within Congressional control." The response is that it is preposterous to
"treat the Constitution, then, as authorizing exceptions which engulf the rule, even to the point of eliminating the appellate jurisdiction altogether." But to the Questioner,
it is so impossible to lay down any measure of a necessary reservation that it seems to me the language of the Constitution must be
taken as vesting plenary control in Congress. A. It's not impossible for me to lay down a measure. The measure is simply that the
exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of
the Supreme Court in the Constitutional plan. McCardle, you will
remember, meets that test. The circuit courts of the United States
14. Tweed, supra note 6, at 1.
15. Roberts, supra note 5, at 3.
16. E.g., Hearings,supra note 12, at 19.
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were still open in habeas corpus. And the Supreme Court itself
could still entertain petitions for the writ which were filed with
it in the first instance. 17
Citing this last passage from the Hart-Wechsler Casebook, into

which meantime it had been incorporated,' 5 Professor Ratner contended in like vein. "It is not reasonable to conclude that the Convention gave Congress the power to destroy [the Court's essential]
role. Reasonably interpreted the clause means 'With such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress may make, not inconsistent with the essential function of the Supreme Court under this
Constitution'."'19 To this argumentation he added a quite technical
one based upon dictionary meanings of the key words.
in legal context an exception cannot destroy the essential
characteristics of the subject to which it applies.
Regulations usually specify conditions for engaging in certain conduct and sometimes forbid a particular act, but authority to prescribe them does not ordinarily include the power 2to prohibit the
entire sphere of activity that is subject to regulation. 0
...

The Ratner thesis was rejected outright by Professor Wechsler:
I see no basis for this view and think it antithetical to the plan of
the Convention for the courts-which was quite simply that the
Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated differently, how far judicial jurisdiction
should be left to the state courts, bound as they are by the Constitution as "the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 2 1
To Professor Wechsler it follows from the seemingly unambiguous wording of the Constitutional paragraph in question,
that Congress has the power by enactment of a statute to strike at
what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the jurisdiction
of the lower courts and of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdica pending case may be extion. Under the McCardle case even
22
cepted from appellate jurisdiction.
Af'the subsequent Hearings of the Senate subcommittee, Senator
17. Hart, supra note 7, at 1364-65.
18. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
312 (1953).
19. Ratner, supra note 9, at 172.
20. Id. at 170, 171.
21. Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1005-06.
22. Id. at 1005.

CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEMI

Ervin, the chairman, was vigorous in espousal of the position taken
by Professor Wechsler:
I have no doubt in my own mind that the Congress has complete
control over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Some take the Klein case to argue to the contrary.
But the Klein case itself recognizes expressly that the appellate
jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court is dependent upon an act of Con2 3
gress.

Moreover, the Senator likes it this way; one of the reasons for insertion of the exceptions-regulations clause was "as a check and
balance which Congress can exercise to restrain the Court whenever the Court needs restraining.

' 24

Among those witnesses at the
this view, Professor William Van
most thoroughly, the case against
recognizing that "the extent of that

Hearings in disagreement with
Alstyne spelled out, by far the
Congressional power. Although
control is uncertain,"

On balance, however, I believe that there are a series of arguments, at least three of which are very substantial, to suggest that
there are very substantial limitations on the power of Congress to
collapse the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the settling of25cases and controversies which seek to resolve constitutional
issues.
From the subsequent detailed presentation it seems that the three
limitations of major substantiality are those growing out of plausible interpretations of the exceptions and regulations clause alternative to "the one which is conventionally preferred." The essence
of each of these three follows:
The first observation is this. That the phrase "with such exceptions" follows the provision which grants the Court authority to review findings of fact as well as conclusions of law. It may be reasonable to read the phrase in context as merely permitting Congress to restrict the Supreme Court from making original findings
of fact, and from substituting
its findings of fact for those deter26
mined by a jury below.

There is a second interpretation that is feasible as well. The
phrase "with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make" may be read conjunctively, that is to say exceptions and regulations conjunctively, to express the thought that
Congress may determine the manner in which cases arising under
the Constitution may reach the Supreme Court, without suggesting, however, that Congress
could wholly forbid such cases from
27
reaching the Court at all.

Finally ... still another interpretation of the exceptions and regulations clause [is that] it may also refer back to earlier portions
23.
24.
25.
26.

Hearings,supra note 12, at 23. See also id. at 22, 131-33.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.

27. Id.
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of sections 1 and 2 of article III, portions which provide first, and
without qualification, that the judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish....
This reading does make considerable sense to me. The Court
then preserves the clearer statement in section 1 that the whole ju-

dicial power of the United States shall be [v]ested as Justice
Story indicated in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, leaving the Congress
to determine whether the power shall be exercised in particular
cases as a matter of original jurisdiction or as a matter of appellate
jurisdiction and as a matter of right by way of appeal
or as a mat28
ter of judicial discretion as a matter of certiorari.

Attorney Berger returns to Professor Hart for guidance, in keeping with his dedication of the volume "To the Memory of Professor
Henry M. Hart, Jr. Who Lit the Way."
Professor Hart justly suggests that a literal reading of the "exceptions" clause would serve to "destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." So far as can be gathered
from the records, that was not the purpose of the "exceptions"
29
clause.

In search of the true purpose, Mr. Berger turns to debates in the
ratifying conventions. "No aspect of Article III was as intensively
debated in the Ratification Conventions as the 'exceptions' clause."
Yet "[t] here is not the faintest intimation in the several convention
records, nor in the contemporary prints, that the 'exceptions' clause
was designed to enable Congress to withdraw jurisdiction to declare an Act of Congress void."30 Rather, the prolonged debate
"turned not at all on a curb on judicial 'excess,' but was solely concerned with review of matters of 'fact'" because of great fear that
the provision would enable Congress to withhold jury trial in civil
cases.31 According to Mr. Berger's researches, so vigorous was the
attack on the grant to the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction
on facts as well as law that supporters of ratification turned to the
immediately following exceptions-regulations clause for defense
against "the imperious demand." Quoting John Marshall himself in
the Virginia Convention, the clause would "go to the cure of the
32
mischief apprehended."
To adapt a familiar Holmesian phrase, to count upon Congress to
28. Id. at 169.
29.
30.
31.
32.

BERGER, supranote 1, at 286.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 288, citing 3 J. ELLiOT, DEBATES 520, 560 (1896).

prevent the Court from 'denying civil trial by jury would be to rely
upon a slender reed. Moreover, a great weakness in this line of
reasoning is that the clause for which meaning is sought appeared
in article XI of the draft constitution presented by the Committee
of Detail on August 6, 1787, 33 whereas the insertion of "as to both
law and fact," after the words "appellate jurisdiction", occurred on
August 27 when the Judiciary Article underwent consideration and
amendment in several particulars. 34 This sequence raises a presumption that the exception-regulations clause was originally included, and continued, for a purpose quite different from that of
limiting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in fact as well
as law. Professor Merry had sought to rebut this presumption by
demonstrating that "While the provision reported by the Committee of Detail did not expressly say that Congress was to have power
to make exceptions and regulations both as to law and fact, substantial grounds exist for concluding that the Committee did struggle with the problem of fact issues."3 5 Yet he conceded that "much
of the evidence is indirect", and his two instances of "direct support", that is, the rapidity with which the law-fact addition was
made on August 27 and the inclusion of a guaranty of jury trial in
criminal cases in proposed article X as submitted on August 6,86
involve non-sequiturs. Grant that each of these are historical
facts but it does not follow that either demonstrates a meaningful
connection between itself and the intended function of the exceptions-regulations clause. Apparently Mr. Berger was not ina-'
pressed, for he makes no reference to either the Merry article or
such a contention.
It might be contended that support for the Berger argument can
be found in rejection on September 15 (during consideration of the
Report of the Committee of Style) of a motion to add to paragraph
three of section 2 of article III the preservation of trial by jury "as
usual in civil cases. '3 7 Analysis of the objections, however, which
were few in number and briefly considered, carries no hint whatsoever of any thought among the delegates that the addition to the
third paragraph was necessary because the exceptions-regulations
clause provided protection against Supreme Court review of jurydetermined facts. The motion failed for the reason that in and
33. DocuATENTs ILLUSTRATIE OF THE FORMATIO N OF THE UNION OF THE

STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 479 (1927)
[hereinafter cited as DocumimTs].
34. Id. at 625.
35. Merry, supra note 10, at 58.
36. Id. at 58-59.
37. Docux=NTs, supra note 33, at 733-34.

AmERICAN
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among the States there were such variations in jury usage as to
make it impossible by constitutional provision to preserve the civil
jury "as usual."38 Mr. Berger recognizes that realization of this
complication lay at the heart of extensive debate in the ratifying
conventions. "The difficulty, in a nutshell, was the greatly varied
practice in the States respecting review of facts, not alone in jury
trials but in admiralty and equity as well."3 9 The effort of supporters of the proposed Constitution to allay the fears of opponents by falling back upon the exceptions-regulations clause was, as
the surrounding circumstances dearly demonstrate, a makeweight
contention that could not by any reasonable interpretation of the
document drain that clause of other meaning.
It is significant that Berger buttresses his attempt to explain
away the disturbing clause by return to the Hart reliance upon "the
40
purpose and structure of the Constitution" taken as a whole.
Brilliant man that he was, Professor Hart sensed there was something about such a grant of power to Congress that did not jibe
with the instrument fashioned by the Framers, and that reconciliation lay in macroscopic rather than microscopic inquiry. There he
left the matter, not so much in the belief he had found a satisfactory cure for the nagging headache as in the hope that he had identified the direction in which further research might profitably go
forward. "The purpose of the discussion is not to proffer final
answers but to ventilate the questions. .. "
Meantime, the modern Court's one excursion into the issue has
done nothing to alleviate the headache. In the course of his opinion for himself and Justices Brennan and Stewart, in Glidden v.
Zdanok,41 Mr. Justice Harlan asserted that Congressional authority
to withdraw the Court's jurisdiction, as it did in McCardle,
is not, of course, unlimited. In 1870, Congress purported to
withdraw jurisdiction from the Court of Claims and from this
Court on appeal over cases seeking indemnification for property
captured during the Civil War, so far as eligibility therefor
might be predicated upon an amnesty awarded by the President,
as both courts had previously held that it might. Despite Ec parte
McCardle, supra, the Court refused to apply the statute to a case
in which the claimant had already been adjudged entitled to recover by the Court of Claims, calling it an unconstitutional at38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
BERGER, supra note 1, at 287.
Hart, supra note 7, at 293-96.
370 U.S. 530 (1962).

tempt to invade the judicial province by prescribing a rule of decision in a pending case. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128.42
By the Justice's own analysis of Klein it sets no limit on Congressional power under the exceptions-regulatons clause but only
differentiates between withdrawal of jurisdiction by the Congress
and Congressional effort, in the guise of regulating the Court's
appellate jurisdiction, to "prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the Government in cases pending before it."
A clearer instance of legislative encroachment upon the central
province of a coordinate branch of government could not be found.
Klein and McCardle have nothing substantial in common; they
treat of entirely different matters. In consequence, Klein identifies no limits to Congressional power over jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Harlan in the quoted paragraph was just not up to his usual
legal acumen.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissent to Glidden joined by Mr. Justice Black, does no better. The distinction between the two cases,
attempted by Mr. Justice Harlan, is, he says, one between a claim
to personal liberty and a property claim. But today "the distinction between liberty and property (which emanates from this portion of my Brother Harlan's opinion) has no vitality even in terms
of the Due Process Clause." 48 The distinction thus failing, it
would appear that the supposedly stronger case for delimitation of
Congressional authority (Klein) is now of no precedential weight
and McCardle rules the constitutional roost! But no, we are assured that "there is a serious question whether the McCardle case
could command a majority view today. '' 44 One is reminded of Mr.
Justice Jackson's complaint that the more a certain matter was explained to him the less he understood it. A jurisprudence oriented
to result is not likely to alleviate any kind of constitutional headache, as Mr. Justice Black has been realizing in recent years.
RECOMMENDED TREATMENT:

HEAVY DOSAGES OF DIFFERENTIATION

TWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL

BE-

REVIW

The term "judicial review" aptly describes the traditional functions of the third branch of Government. Principal among these
are statutory or common-law interpretation, and canalization of
executive discretion. Legislative promulgation or common-law
precedent is reviewed to determine the thrust of statute or judgemade law, while executive implementation is reviewed for indica42. Id. at 568.
43. Id. at 605, n.1.
44. Id.
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tion of abuse in the inevitable discretion involved in application of
general policy to concrete situation. Uninvolved is any judicial determination of constitutionality, that is, "constitutional review;"
although it was the genius of Coke and Montesquieu to appreciate
the contribution to delimitation of governmental power that could
be made by a strong, co-ordinate judiciary. The exercise of each
of these two differentiated types of review may be on the horizon45
tal or on the vertical.
The Judiciary Article as it was reported by the Committee of
Detail, article XI, bestowed upon the Supreme Court both original
and appellate jurisdiction.46 The former was in scope essentially
that carried into article III of the Constitution, save for original
jurisdiction over impeachments. The Court's appellate jurisdiction, "with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Legislature shall make," ran to categories of case or controversy
familiar in the subsequent Constitutional grant except for four
later additions, of which one was all cases arising under "this Constitution." There is no indication that the the Committee of Detail
had in mind for the Supreme Court, whether in appellate or original jurisdiction, anything but the exercise of judicial review in instances deemed to be of federal dimension. Stated otherwise, that
47
Committee was creating the third branch of the new government,
understandably investing the new Court with a range of power in
judicial review reflecting judgment as to the proper line of demarcation between federal and state judicial authority.
When, three weeks later, the Convention delegates finally
reached consideration of article XI, a number of actions were rather
quickly taken. Already remarked was the express designation
that the Court's appellate jurisdiction was to be "both as to law and
45. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE
L.J. 1 [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne], is helpful to an appreciation
of the several respects in which courts may function as participants in
delimitation of governmental power.
46. DocumnmTs, supra note 33, at 479.
47. The Notes of both James Madison and Robert Yates record that on
May 30 there was consideration and approval (though not with unanimity) of the Randolph resolve "that a national Government ought to be
established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary."
Id., at 120-22, 740. On June 13 the Committee of the Whole in its report
to the Convention made this its first Resolution, id. at 201, and the great
influence of Montesquieu carried this view through the entire subsequent
deliberations.

fact." Among several additions to the Federal "Judicial power,"
substituted for "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" in the
section setting forth the categories of case or controversy assigned
to the judicial branch of the new government, was insertion of that
respecting constitutional cases. On this addition, as on all other
actions that day of August 27, recorded debate was very brief.
Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend
the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising under the
Constitution and whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a
Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in
cases not of this nature ought not to be given that Department.
The motion of Doc. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being
given was constructively
generally supposed that the jurisdiction
48
limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.
In searching Madison's notes for a reasonable explanation of
Doctor Johnson's motion, and the condition on which agreement
was reached, one is struck by the parallel between the evolution of
what became article IH and that of the Supremacy Clause. Article
VIII as reported by the Committee of Detail reads as follows:
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the several
States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the
several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; anything
in the Constitution or laws of the several States to the contrary
notwithstanding. 49
Consideration of article VIII preceded by four days that of article
XI. On the 23d of August Mr. Rutledge moved an amendment
"which was agreed to nem: contrad:" The amendment altered
the great portion of article VIII only in capitalization and punctuation, but the article was now to open "This Constitution and the
,50 Thus the exlaws of the U.S. made in pursuance thereof. ...
tension to judicial power under article XI of all cases arising under
the Constitution as well as under the laws and treaties of the
United States followed shortly upon an identical alteration in the
scope of the Supremacy Clause. From this sequence it is more than
reasonable to conclude that Doctor Johnson's amendment to article
XI was for the single purpose of conferring upon the Supreme
Court of the United States power to exercise vertical constitutional
review with respect to State court dispositions of cases involving
issues under the new Constitution of the United States.
The Committee of Style, reporting on September 12, proposed no
48. Id. at 625.
49. Id. at 476.

50. Id. at 603. The citation is to Madison's Notes.
recordation of this action by Dr. James McHenry, id. at 942.

Compare the
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substantive alterations in article XI, now renumbered III; for the
Supremacy Clause, now incorporated into new article VI, the only
change was to declare the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States to be "the supreme law of the land" rather than of
"the several States, their citizens and inhabitants."5 1 Debate on
article III produced only rejection of the move to add right of jury
trial in civil cases; 52 further consideration of article VI was lost in
the pressure to terminate the Convention with a report to the
Continental Congress.5 3 However, in debate on the Export-Import
Clause, as it came from the Committee of Style, there developed
considerable concern over the reach of the prohibition on State
taxes on exports. Several favored a proviso that would afford some
54
relaxation from the prohibition. At this point.
Mr. Gorham and Mr. Langdon, thought there would be no security if the proviso should be agreed to, for the States exporting
through other States, against the oppressions of the latter. How
was redress to be obtained in case duties should be laid beyond the
purpose expressed?
Mr. Madison. There will be the same security as in other cases.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must be the source of redress. So far only had provision been made against injurious acts
of the States. His own opinion was, that this was insufficient. A
negative on the State laws alone could meet all the shapes
which these could assume. But this had been overruled.
Out of the debate came the ultimate wording that "No State shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws. .. ." Significant for present purposes is the clear tie that Madison makes back to the action taken
on August 27; constitutional review had been introduced into the
Court's appellate jurisdiction for the limited function of control
of State actiQn inconsistent with prohibitions contained in the Federal Constitution. Later, when Hamilton came, in Number 80 of
the Federalist Papers, to examine the scope of the judicial power
under article III, the context in which he considered "cases arising
under the Constitution" was that of vertical review of the validity
of State legislative acts. The passages are most enlightening in
51. Id. at 712.
52. Id. at 733-34.
53. According to Madison's Notes review of the report of the Committee
of Style ended with article V. See, id. at 736.
54. Id. at 717.

view of the Convention action of August 27, and of Madison's un-

derstanding of it as disclosed on September 12.
As to "the proper extent of the federal judicature," Hamilton's
"first point" is
that there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving
efficacy to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would
avail restrictions on the authority of the State legislatures without
some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them?
[Citing prohibitions on the States contained in the Constitution of
the United States]. No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power
in the government to restrain or correct infractions of them. This
power must either be a direct negative on the State laws or an authority in the federal courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union. There is no third
course that I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought
by the convention preferable to the former, and, I presume, will be
most agreeable to the States. 55
Hamilton's "second point" is the "mere necessity of uniformity in
the interpretation of the national laws. . ..,;
Corresponding
"with the first two classes of causes" is the extension of the Federal
judicial power "To all cases in law and equity, arising under the
1
Constitution and the laws of the United States."
Distinguishing
between the two, Hamilton asserts that
[a]lI the restrictions upon the authority of the State Legislatures
furnish examples of it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper
money; but the interdiction results from the Constitution, and will
have no connection with any law of the United States. Should
paper money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the controversies concerning it would be cases arising under the Constitution and not the
laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification
of the terms.
This may serve as an example of the whole.58
".

Perhaps in these passages Hamilton does not mean to limit constitutional review wholly to the vertical dimension, although their
significance cannot be denied for their indication of the type of
constitutional review he believed the Constitution clearly warranted. A satisfactory judgment on his views is difficult to make
with respect to the role to be played by the Supreme Court and
possible lower Federal courts in effecting limitations on governmental power; some commentators have even thought they found
inconsistency among the various Numbers of the Federalist in
which Hamilton treated the Judiciary. 9 There is the paragraph in
55. THE FExnsAIzsT, No. 80, at 236 (Fairfield 2d ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton)
[hereinafter cited as THE FEDERALIST].
56. Id. at 237.
57. Id. at 239.
58. Id. at 240.
59. Number 81 has been troublesome. Thus Louis Boudin interpreted
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Number 78 which has always been taken as proof that he fully embraced horizontal constitutional review:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I
understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the
legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no
bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations
of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through
the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing.0
Yet the paragraph immediately preceding sounds in terms of
wholly defensive use of constitutional review of the horizontal dimension.
This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can
never attack with success either of the other two; and that all
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their
attacks. It equally proves that though individual oppression may
now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty
of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean
so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislait as entirely contradictory to assertions in Number 78. 1 L. BouDwn, GovERNMVENT BY JuDIcmARY 111-13 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Bonnlx]. Difficulty has centered on the meaning of Hamilton's denial "that the Parliament of Great Britain or the legislatures of the particular States, can
rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts in any other
sense than might be done by a future legislature of the United States.
The theory neither of the British, nor the State constitutions, authorizes
the revisal of a judicial sentence by a legislative act."

THE FEDERALIST,

supra note 55, at 244-45. Differentiation between constitutional and judicial review quickly dissipates the confusion. Hamilton was in the early
portion of Number 81 responding to criticism of "the particular organization of the Supreme Court in its being composed of a distinct body of
magistrates, instead of being one of the branches of the legislature, as in
the government of Great Britain and that of the State [of New York]."
Id. at 243. The passage so puzzling to Mr. Boudin was but asserting that
finality of decision was a hallmark of judicial review in all three judicial
systems, despite differences in judicial organization. "A legislature, with-

out exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a
particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases." Id.
at 254. This is a necessary principle of judicial status under a separationof-powers doctrine that posits the independence of a third, the judicial,
branch. A largely disregarded paragraph in a later portion of Number 78
demonstrates that Hamilton grasped the vital difference between constitutional and judicial review. Id. 231-32.
60. THE FEDERAIST, supra note 55, at 228.

ture and the executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if
be not separated from the legislative and
the power of judging
61
executive powers."

A limited conception of horizontal constitutional review on Hamilton's part would not be surprising; the actual exercises of it by
State courts between Independence and Ratification were mostly
defensive in nature. Holmes v. Walton 6 2 in 1780 and Trevett v.
Weedon, 63 1786, invalidated legislation restrictive of trial by jury.
The decision usually regarded as the most significant precedent by
Convention time was Bayard v. Singleton64 in which the North
Carolina court declared unconstitutional a statute of that State that
sought in a class of litigation to deny to North Carolina courts the
authority to engage in judicial review. Only Commonwealth v.
Caton,65 decided in 1782, involved judicial experimentation with
invalidation of legislative action not directed at the judicial department, and there are features of it which sharply curtail its rele60
vance. Louis Boudin challenged the authenticity of the case.
Assuming its authenticity it technically concerned formal, not substantive, constitutional review;6 7 and the major legislative-judicial
clash in Virginia, the remonstrance of the Court of Appeals to the
General Assembly, concerned a refusal of the State judges to act
under certain legislation of the Assembly because that legislation
of the judicial
was asserted to interfere with the independence
68
branch under the Virginia constitution.
Similar ambivalence marks the Convention debates, despite Mr.
Berger's irritation with those who press the point. To him the
doubts of Boudin-Crosskey-Corwin as to whether the intent of the
Framers went beyond judicial self-defense are unjustified, yet the
ghost will not down. Thus
Professor Hart's crushing refutation should have given "self-defense" its coup de grace, notwithstanding which Professor Westin
"the Court could go behas since referred to the problem whether
yond defense of its own prerogatives."69
61. Id. at 227. The remainder of the paragraph isomitted.
62. Reported in C. HAINES, THE Aw _mcAN DOCTRIN oF
PREmACY 92 (1932).
63. 2 CHANDLER Cnnvr. TRnAns 269 (1844).
64. 1 N.C. 5 (1787).

JUDICIAL

SU-

65. 4 Call. (Va.) 5 (1782).

66. BouniN, supra note 59, Appendix C.
67. Formal constitutional review, ordinarily referred to as formal judicial review, isconcerned with legislative adherence to constitutional requirements for the enactment of legislation. Itisdefined in Corwin, Judicial Review, 8 ENcYc. Soc.Sci. 475, 463 (1932), and further considered inF.
STRONG, AmEmIcAN CoNsTunr~oNAL LAw 385-86, 1015-19

after cited as STRONG].
68. 1 Va. Cases 98 (1788).
69. BERGER, supra note 1, at 155.

(1950)
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It is familiar history that on May 29 Governor Randolph proposed to the Convention fifteen Resolutions, of which the eighth was
Res.d that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it
shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National
Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature
be
of the members of each branch.70
again negatived by
On June 4 this Resolution came before the Convention, sitting "In
Committee of the Whole." Both Madison and Yates took notes on
debate with respect to the first half of the Resolution. The notes
vary, Madison's being the fuller, but there is no disagreement between them as to views expressed or actions taken. From Yates:
Mr. Gerry objects to the clause-moves its postponement in order
to let in a motion-that the right of revision should be in the executive only.
Mr. Wilson contends that the executive and judicial ought to
have a joint and full negative-they cannot otherwise preserve
their importance against the legislature.
Mr. King was against the interference of the judicial-they may be
biased in the interpretation-He is therefore to give the executive
a complete negative.
Carried to be postponed, 6 States against 4-New York for it.71
The Madison notes expand on Mr. Gerry's views as follows:
Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of
it, as they will have a sufficient check ag.st encroachments on
their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some
States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being ag.st the
Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It
was quite foreign from the nature of y.e office to make them
judges of the policy of public measures. He moves to postpone
the clause in order to propose "that the National Executive shall
have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be
afterwards passed
by
parts of each branch of the national
Legislature."72
The notes of Rufus King for June 4 take up with the ensuing
motion of Mr. Gerry "to postpone the article for a Council of Revision, and to vest a qualified Negative in the Executive." King
70. DocuMr.NTs, supra note 33, at 118.
71. Id. at 752.
72. Id. at 147.

records that upon adoption of the motion, "by all States except
Cont. & Mard.," several delegates spoke in opposition to a motion
by Hamilton and Wilson that the Negative be complete, after which
the latter went down to defeat with only the movers, and King, in
support. Then, according to the King notes, Madison delivered
himself as follows:
The judiciary ought to be introduced in the business of Legislation-they will protect their department, and united with the
Executive make its negatives more strong. There is weight in the
objections to this measure-but a check on the Legislature is necessary .... We must therefore introduce in our system Provisions

against the measures of an interested majority-a check is not only
necessary to protect the Executive power, but the minority in the
Legislature. The independence of the Executive, having the Eyes
of all upon him will make him an impartial judge--add the Judiciary, and you greatly increase his respectability.73

From the above it is quite apparent that the extended consideration of the merits of a Council of Revision began with the view that
any judicial participation in it would be for the purpose of protecting the Judiciary against encroachments by the National Legislature, exactly in line with judicial development of the period. A recombing of subsequent debates will not be undertaken here; the
Berger review is inadequate in itself but footnotes to numerous
more comprehensive searches including that of his idol, Professor
Hart.74 It suffices to observe that in subsequent consideration
some delegates did appear to carry the concept of horizontal constitutional review beyond the defensive to embrace all manner of acts
of Congress. However the evidence of abandonment of the original
view of the limited function of that type of review does not compel
the crucial contention of Berger and others that in passing without
debate Doctor Johnson's motion of August 27, adding "all cases
arising under this constitution," the delegates intended to legitimate the full range of horizontal constitutional review. Indeed, it
is not at all clear that the motion was intended to provide for any
degree of constitutional review of the horizontal type. As has been
demonstrated, 75 the convincing evidence is that the Framers were
there making provision only for Supreme Court exercise of vertical
constitutional review.
There is no indication whatsoever that in adding the vertical segment of constitutional reviewing power to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the Convention delegates sensed any conflict between such an extension and Congressional power over that jurisdic73. Id. at 848.
74. BGER, supra note 1, at 154-65.

75. See text accompanying note 47, supra.
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tion. They had, by another action on August 27, seen a conflict between legislative authority with respect to judicial jurisdiction and
legislative authority over the judicial function. Seemingly anticpating the problem of Klein, "The following motion was disagreed to,
to wit to insert 'In all the other cases before mentioned the Judicial
power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall
direct.' "76 But with respect to the categories of case or controversy
originally included within the Court's appellate jurisdiction for
purposes of judicial review, it was of the essence of good sense to
leave to the legislative branch authority to make exceptions to, as
well as regulations for, that jurisdictional bulk. There was double good sense for such a provision in light of the provision, in the
draft of the Committee of Detail, authorizing the federal legislature
to create inferior federal courts should it see fit to do so.
To leave to the legislative branch the power to undercut effective
implementation of the Supremacy Clause is of a wholly different
dimension. It is conceivable that the delegates saw no conflict
because they could not conceive that a department of the new
federal government would ever be disposed to take such action.
It is far more likely, however, that tired from three weeks of intensive consideration of the complete draft for a Constitution submitted by the Committee of Detail, and attempting in one day to
review and resolve six proposed alterations in the Judiciary Article, the delegates did not realize they were by Doctor Johnson's
amendment giving the left hand power to take away that which
they had given with the right hand in the interest of federal supremacy. In the clarity afforded by this narrow focus, there is presented an issue of internal inconsistency of a nature justifying
preference for an interpretation of the constitutional paragraph
guaranteeing judicial power vertically to review for constitutionality over the interpretation granting legislative power to withhold
such appellate jurisdiction. Reliance could properly be placed on
Professor Hart's thesis that the exceptions-regulations clause cannot rightly be permitted to destroy the Court's essential role in
the constitutional plan because that thesis is now domesticated in
a specific context that removes much of its self-serving, "must have
been" generalization with respect to Framer intent in the face of
unexplained constitutional language to the contrary.
76. DOCUMNTS, supra note 33, at 625.

Near-contemporaneous action by the First Congress, in which sat
many of the former Convention delegates, may offer the most satisfactory resolution of the issue of more precise limits under this
general proposition. The celebrated section 25 did not exhaust the
total reach of the Constitutional grant to the Supreme Court of its
appellate jurisdiction over State courts. Familiar is the final sentence of section 25:77
But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face

of the record, and immediately respects the before mentioned
questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commission, or authorities in dispute.

Congress here restricted vertical constitutional and judicial review
to federal questions, whereas article IMI extends the Court's appellate jurisdiction to "all cases . . . arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made. . .

."

By the

Act of 1867 Congress omitted this last sentence, presumably in line
with its general determination to extend Federal authority over
the States. By a Herculean act of statutory misinterpretation,
rivaling his earlier performance at the level of constitutional interpretation in the Slaughter-House Cases,7 8 Mr. Justice Miller managed the conclusion that no change in the scope of the Court's appellate jurisdiction vis-A-vis State courts had been intended.' 9 But
the Congressional power was there, as the majority did not deny,8 0
as Mr. Justice Bradley asserted in dissent,8 1 as Justices Clifford and
Swayne assumed in their dissent, 2 and as ex-Justice Curtis convincingly contended in his brief amicus curiae. 88
There continues to this day this Congressional exception to the
full reach of the Court's appellate jurisdiction over State courts
in re constitutional review, as given by the Constitution.8 4 Com77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (1789).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
Id. at 638.
Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 638-39.

83. B. CURTIs, JURIsDICTION, PRAcTIcE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF TE

59-63 (2d ed. 1896).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1257, restricting Supreme Court review to those situa-

CouRTS or T=E UNITED STATEs

tions where, in "the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had," there is "drawn in question" the validity of a treaty or statute of the

United States, or the validity of a State statute, or "where any title, right,
privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under Federal Constitution, statute, treaty, commission or authority." Section 2 of article M of
course extends to "all cases" arising under the Constitution, laws and

treaties of the United States. Cf. Tracy v. Ginsberg, 205 U.S. 170 (1907),
assuming reviewing authority under diversity of citizenship.
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ing down to us as it does from 1789, it can with much justification be
taken as the intended guide to the extent of Congressional authority
under the substantive portion of the exceptions-regulations clause.
At the Subcommittee Hearings Professor Gunther put the point
well by way of further illustration: 8 5
For a good many years in our history, lots of cases arising in the
State courts, for example, involving Federal issues could not be
brought to the Supreme Court. They cannot all be brought to the
Supreme Court now.
For example, the restriction involved in the old section 25 of the
Judiciary Act in 1789 meant that, until the 20th century, cases in
which the Federal right was denied in the State court did not go
to the Supreme Court. These were after all restrictions of a substantive nature.
They were not simply procedural matters as to when you file a
case or how you prepare a case or how you raise the issues. I think
they were of great substantive significance in the sense that a very
large bulk of potential Supreme Court material did not get to the
Supreme Court because of the congressional failure to vest the
whole jurisdiction.
I don't think it follows from that, that any kind of congressional
control of appellate jurisdiction therefore must be permissible.
So far as the Framers were concerned, then, provision for constitutional review was incorporated into the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction for the single explicit purpose of providing an
effective deterrent against State enactments, legislative or constituent, inconsistent with the new Constitution of the United States
yet bearing the imprimatur of a State's Judges. But until ratified
the document was only "a scrap of paper" and what the Ratifiers
understood in making it an operative instrument of governance is
another matter. From his exhaustive study Berger is convinced
that ratification was achieved on the understanding that horizontal constitutional review of Acts of Congress was assured by article III's extension of judicial power to all cases arising under the
Constitution. Debates in and accompanying the ratifying conventions, he asserts, reveal both great demand for Court invalidation
of Congressional acts violative of the Constitution and assumption
that the document provided that power; "A restrictive reading of
the 'arising under' clause can not be extracted from textual compulsions";88 therefore, Q. E. D.
85. Hearings,supranote 12, at 17.
86. BERGER,supra note 1, at 217.

Accepting the accuracy of the Berger findings with respect to
the great debates on ratification and granting that on its face
alone, without contextual setting, the phrase in question can carry
the broader meaning, nevertheless the Berger contention experiences three major difficulties. First, if article III embraces horizontal constitutional review-and concededly there is no other provision on which such judicial power can be rested-it immediately
becomes subject, save as capable of exercise through the Court's
original jurisdiction, to Congressional authority to make exceptions
thereto. All effort, whether by Mr. Berger, Professor Van Alstyne,
or others, to be rid of the irritant exceptions-regulations clause by
contending that it was designed to take the sting from the law-andfact clause is unconvincing, as has been shown. Article III is a
veritable trap for those who understandably feel better if they
can persuade themselves that the Constitution did indeed incorporate horizontal as well as vertical constitutional review.
Secondly, while the debates over ratification may be taken as
indicating the appeal of extension to the horizontal level of the
judicial power to rule with finality on issues of constitutionality,
the evidence presented by Mr. Berger8 7 does not convincingly
demonstrate that the Constitution as ratified must be read as itself
textually incorporating such a broadened conception of the part
that the third branch of the new Government was to play under
that Instrument. There is a serious variance between pleading
and proof. The same criticism is to be made of Berger evidence
that the growing acceptance of constitutional review of acts of
88
Congress can be traced in the First Congress.
A final difficulty in the Berger-type thesis lies in the irreconciliability of the asserted clarity of documentary inclusion of horizontal constitutional review with the travail involved in full establishment of Supreme Court authority to review Acts of Congress
for consistency with the Constitution. On its facts Marbury v.
Madison8 established only that the Court had the power to declare
unconstitutional Congressional action allegedly encroaching on the
Court's own bailiwick as the third branch of the new Government.
In a word, the exercise of constitutional review was defensive,
strikingly like the North Carolina court's holding in Bayard v.
Singleton,"° to which Louis Boudin, in his monumental attempt to
disprove the legitimacy of constitutional review, took no exception.0 1
87. Id. ch. 4.
88. Id. ch. 5.

89. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
90. Cited supra note 64.
91. BouDN, supra note 59, at 66.
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Professor Van Alstyne is quite correct that Chief Justice Marshall
was by dictum after much bigger game.92 But convincing demonstration of textual basis for the exercise of affirmative constitutional review of Acts of Congress was more than a match for even
Marshall's great talents, and acceptance of this power in the Supreme Court has had to come more by faith than by proof.
Careful differentiation between constitutional review and judicial review lays basis for understanding why the Marshall dictum
in Marbury has experienced such difficulty in its metamorphosis
into unquestioned doctrine. In his brilliant although unappreciated dissent in Eakin v. Raub,93 Mr. Justice Gibson had no difficulty at all with the vertical constitutional review involved in testing State legislative action against the norms of the Federal Constitution.
By becoming parties to the federal constitution, the states have
agreed to several limitations of their individual sovereignty, to enforce which, it was thought absolutely necessary to prevent them
from giving effect to laws in violation of 94those limitations,
through the instrumentality of their own judges.

Then quoting in full the Supremacy Clause, Gibson continued
This is an express grant of a political power and it is conclusive
to show that no law of inferior obligation, as every state law must
expense of the constitution,
necessarily be, can be executed at the
laws, or treaties of the United States. 95
It followed that even the Pennsylvania Judges must exercise this

"political power" of constitutional review to the extent of determining the consistency of any Pennsylvania legislative act with the
Federal Constitution. But this "is not all," for by article III
thereof, implemented by Act of Congress, the Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction over State court determinations to the extent
of their involvment of federal questions.
This is another guard against infraction of the limitations imposed
on state sovereignty, and one which is extremely efficient in practice; for reversals of decisions in favour of the constitutionality of
on writs of error to the Suacts of assembly, have been frequent
96

preme Court of the United States.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Van Alstyne, supra note 45, at 34-36.
12 Serg. &R. (Pa.) 330, 343, 358 (1825).
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
Id. Gibson could have had in mind McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.

(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)

But to Mr. Justice Gibson the claim by a judiciary, whether
State or Federal, of power to exercise horizontal constitutional review was quite another matter. Extensive quotation is essential
97
to full understanding of the Gibson reasoning.
It seems to me ....
there is a plain difference, hitherto unnoticed, between acts that are repugnant to the constitution of the
particular state, and acts that are repugnant to the constitution of
the United States; my opinion being, that the judiciary is bound
to execute the former, but not the latter. I shall hereafter attempt
to explain this difference, by pointing out the particular provisions
in the constitution of the United States, on which it depends. I
am aware, that a right to declare all unconstitutional acts void,
without distinction as to either constitution, is generally held as a
professional dogma; but, I apprehend, rather as a matter of faith
than of reason. I admit, that I once embraced the same doctrine,
but without examination, and I shall, therefore, state the arguments
that impelled me to abandon it, with great respect for those by
whom it is still maintained. But I may premise, that it is not a
little remarkable, that although the right in question has all along
been claimed by the judiciary, no judge has ventured to discuss
it, except Chief Justice Marshall, (in Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch, 176); and if the argument of a jurist so distinguished for
the strength of his ratiocinative powers be found inconclusive, it
may fairly be set down to the weakness of the position which he
attempts to defend ....

The constitution is a collection of funda-

mental laws, not to be departed from in practice, nor altered by judicial decision, and in the construction of it, nothing would be so
alarming as the doctrine of communis error,which affords a ready
justification for every usurpation that has not been resisted in
limine. Instead, therefore, of resting on the fact, that the right in
question has universally been assumed by the American courts,
the judge who asserts it ought to be prepared to maintain it on
the principles of the constitution.
I begin, then, by observing, that in this country, the powers of the
judiciary are divisible into those that are POLITICAL, and those
that are purely CIVIL. Every power by which one organ of the
government is enabled to control another, or to exert an influence
over its acts, is a political power. The political powers of the judiciary are extraordinary and adventitious; such, for instance, as
are derived from certain peculiar provisions in the constitution of
the United States, of which hereafter; and they are derived, by direct grant, from the common fountain of all political power. On
the other hand, its civil, are its ordinary and appropriate powers;
being part of its essence, and existing independently of any supposed grant in the constitution. But where the government exists
by virtue of a written constitution, the judiciary does not necessarily derive from that circumstance, any other than its ordinary
and appropriate powers. Our judiciary is constructed on the principles of the common law, which enters so essentially into the
518 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In these and
other decisions of his time on the Court, Marshall was, after Marbury, concerned with vertical constitutional review of State action challenged as
violative of the commerce or contract clauses of the Constitution of the
United States.
97. The following passages appear id. at 344-51.
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composition of our social institutions as to be inseparable from
them, and to be, in fact, the basis of the whole scheme of our
civil and political liberty. In adopting any organ or instrument of
the common law, we take it with just such powers and capacities
as were incident to it at the common law, except where these are
expressly, or by necessary implication, abridged or enlarged in the
act of adoption; and that such act is a written instrument, cannot
Now, what are the
vary its consequences or construction....
powers of the judiciary at the common law? They are those
that necessarily arise out of its immediate business; and they
are, therefore, commensurate only with the judicial execution of
the municipal law, or, in other words, with the administration
of distributive justice, without extending to any thing of a
political cast whatever. . . . With us, although the legislature be the depository of only so much of the sovereignty as
the people have thought fit to impart, it is, nevertheless, sovereign within the limit of its powers, and may relatively claim
the same pre-eminence here that it may claim elsewhere. It
will be conceded, then, that the ordinary and essential powers
of the judiciary do not extend to the annulling of an act of the
legislature. Nor can the inference [to] be drawn from this, be
evaded by saying that in England the constitution, resting in
principles consecrated by time, and not in an actual written compact, and being subject to alteration by the very act of the legislature, there is consequently no separate and distinct criterion by
which the question of constitutionality may be determined; for
it does not follow, that because we have such a criterion, the application of it belongs to the judiciary. I take it, therefore, that the
power in question does not necessarily arise from the judiciary
being established by a written constitution, but that this organ can
claim, on account of that circumstance, no powers that do not belong to it at the common law; and that, whatever may have been
the cause of the limitation of its jurisdiction originally, it can exercise no power of supervision over the legislature, without producing a direct authority for it in the constitution, either in terms or
by irresistible implication from the nature of the government:
without which, the power must be considered as reserved, along
with the other ungranted portions of the sovereignty, for the immediate use of the people.

Having demonstrated the basic distinction, in nature and source
of the power, between judicial review and constitutional review,

Mr. Justice Gibson continued:
The constitution of Pennsylvania contains no express grant of
political powers to the judiciary. But, to establish a grant by implication, the constitution is Said to be a law of superior obligation; and, consequently, that if it were to come into collision with
an act of the legislature, the latter would have to give way; this
is conceded. But it is a fallacy, to suppose that they can come
into collision before the judiciary. ...
Now, as the judiciary is not expressly constituted for that purpose, it must derive whatever authority of the sort it may possess,

from the reasonableness and fitness of the thing. But, in theory,
all the"organs of the government are of equal capacity; or, if not
equal, each must be supposed to have superior capacity only for
those things which peculiarly belong to it; and as legislation peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations which are
put on the law-making power, and the interpretation of the laws
when made, involves only the construction of the laws themselves,
it follows, that the construction of the constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature, which ought, therefore, to be taken
to have superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its
own acts. But suppose all to be of equal capacity, in every respect,
why should one exercise a controlling power over the rest? That
the judiciary is of superior rank, has never been pretended, although it has been said to be coordinate. It is not easy, however,
to comprehend how the power which gives law to all the rest,
can be of no more than equal rank with one which receives it, and
is answerable to the former for the observance of its statutes. Legislation is essentially an act of sovereign power; but the execution
of the laws by instruments that are governed by prescribed rules,
and exercise no power of volition, is essentially otherwise.
Later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Gibson presumably abandoned his position in Eakin, partly because of
general acceptance of "the pretensions of the courts" and partly
"from experience of the necessity of the case."9 8 The two given
reasons would appear to point in the same direction:
The fault line in the logic of the "dissent" . .. lies in this-that
the presence in American constitutions of separation-of-power provisions looking to continuance of judicial [review] does not, as
Justice Gibson then supposed, necessarily negative intendment
that the judiciary also assume the entirely new and different role
of constitutional interpreter and adjudicator. 99
There is no basis for the assertion that the new judicial role was
the consequence of judicial usurpation; the evidence to the contrary is convincing. But the evidence is equally convincing that
clear differentiation of the new role from the old was slow in coming and that once achieved, a basis for constitutional review must
be "'read back" into a document predicated primarily upon conception of the judicial role as that of the exercise of judicial review.
Further testimony to the continuing difficulty of clear differentiation is furnished by Professor Edward S. Corwin, the political
scientist whose views on constitutional matters were in his time
more influential than those of most constitutional lawyers. Invited to prepare the topic of "Judicial Review" for the original Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Professor Corwin wrote that
while the "official theory" of judicial review (that is, constitutional
review)
accounts sufficiently for the power of the court to decide cases by
98. Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1845).
99. STRONG, supra note 67, at 116.
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rules drawn directly from the constitution, it does not account for
the fact that such rules are generally regarded as binding the legislature in the shaping of future legislation. To explain this, the essential feature of judicial review, one must fall back upon a somewhat mystical notion of the relation of judges to law.1 00
The necessity in 1932 of reliance upon "a mystical notion" to explain "the essential feature" of at least horizontal constitutional
review constitutes a telling indication of the difficulty of accommodating the Court's new role with traditional views of the judicial
function. Only in the new, contemporary International Encylcopedia of the Social Sciences does differentiation of function begin
0
to emerge.' '
So with the Supreme Court itself, the emancipation of constitutional review has been slow and tortuous. One need but recall
the final paragraph of Massachusetts v. Mellon 0 2 to which even
Mr. Justice Brandeis noted no exception:
The functions of government under our system are apportioned.
To the legislative department has been committed the duty of
making laws; to the executive the duty of executing them; and
to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases
properly brought before the courts. The general rule is that neither
department may invade the province of the other and neither may
control, direct or restrain the action of the other. We are not now
speaking of the merely ministerial duties of officials. Gaines v.
Thompson, 7 Wall. 347. We have no power per se to review and
annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a
justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power
exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable
to the controversy. It amounts to little more than the negative
power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right.
The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only
that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally. If a case for preventive
relief be presented the court enjoins, in effect, not the execution
of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute notwithstanding. Here the parties plaintiff have no such case. Looking through
forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely
that officials of the executive department of the government are
executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be uncon100. Corwin, supra note 67, at 457.
101. Tanenhaus, Judicial Review, 8 INTL ENcyc. Soc. Scr. 303 (1968).
102. 262 U.S. 447 (1920).

stitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To do so would be
not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.103
It is a far cry from such a view of the Court's position in the governmental system to that twice expressed by the Warren Court.
Although Cooper v. Aaron'10 4 was the Court's response to renewed
assertions of the outworn doctrine of interposition, the opinion of
the Court by the nine individual Justices reached beyond reaffirmation of their authority in vertical constitutional review.
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme law of the land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking
for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." This decision declared the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.' 0 5
In three sentences not only is Marshall's trial-balloon dictum at
long last enshrined as "basic principle" but the Court makes bold
The
to claim that there has never been any question about it!
step from the defensive, almost apologetic explanation of Mellon
to the assertive, historically inaccurate declaration of Cooper is
truly Bunyanesque. A baker's dozen of years since, in litigation
involving the exercise of horizontal constitutional review, Chief
06
makes the whole travail
Justice Warren, in Powell v. McCormack,1
to
have
been
so
unnecessary.
seem
Respondents' alternate contention is that the case presents a
political question because judicial resolution of petitioners' claim
would produce a "potentially embarrassing confrontation between
coordinate branches" of the Federal Government. But, as our interpretation of Art. I, § 5, discloses, a determination of Petitioner
Powell's right to sit would require no more than an interpretation
of the Constitution. Such a determination falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law, and does not involve a "lack of respect due [a] co-ordinate branch of government," nor does it involve an "initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr . .. Our
system of government requires that federal courts on occasion
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conjustify the courts'
flict that such adjudication may cause cannot
7
avoiding their constitutional responsibility.10
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 488-89.
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Id. at 18.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
Id. at 548-49.

Nagging Constitutional Headache
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

But simplistically obvious as judicial authority for constitutional
review was to the Warren Court, it required one century and most
of a second to achieve its domestication in the American constitutional framework. It was far from easy to come by, given the emphasis in the late eighteenth century on the political theory of
separation of powers and the essentiality of its incorporation into
American constitutions through provision for the broad exercise of
judicial review. Domestic hindsight is treacherous here as in any
interpretational context; so are deductions from the ease and rapidity with which other nations borrowing from us have grasped
the distinction between the two types of review, even to the extent
of establishing separate courts for the exercise of judicial and of
constitutional adjudication. The only adequate explanation for
the ultimate in constitutional review, the horizontal, is that as with
Topsy it "just grew" -until it forced a fulsome recognition of its
own unique character and justification. To this functional view
Learned Hand gave the adherence of his impressive intellectual
strength. Although necessarily ineffective in his criticism of this
view, Mr. Berger does accurately summarize it: 108
In his 1958 Lectures, Judge Hand, though "unwilling to rest on the
historical evidence," was prepared to "interpolate" a power of judicial [i.e. constitutional] review in order to "keep the States,
Congress, and the President within their prescribed powers."
Otherwise Congress would have been "substantially omnipotent"
and the government "would almost certainly have foundered."
This, he stated, is "not a logical deduction from the structure of
the Constitution but only a practical condition upon its successful
operation."
PROGNOSIS:

RELIEF FROM THE NAGGING HEADACHE

Embrasure of the interpolative justification of horizontal constitutional review will bring quick and lasting relief. For under
this approach there is no technical reliance upon the "arising under" clause and therefore no problem of conflict with the exceptions-and-regulations clause. Rather, horizontal constitutional review is understood as an evolutionary aspect of a constitutional
plan understandably still incomplete in total construct at the time
of drafting and ratifting the fundamental law of the new Nation.
108.

supra note 1, at 219, quoting from L. HAND, THE BILL OF
14-15 (1958). It is to be noted that Judge Hand did not find in the
historical document basis for even vertical constitutional review.
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Consistent with the mature vision of Henry Hart as to "the essential role of the Supreme Court" in that constitutional plan, lodgement for the horizontal aspect of constitutional review can be
found in the interstices of the Constitution as an instrument conceived in the womb of time for the realization of human liberty
through the fashioning of effective limitations on the power of
Government. Such intangible lodgement, although unsatisfactory
to those literalists who feel insecure in the absence of explicit
chapter and verse, constitutes the best guarantee of full judicial
power in the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of
behavior by all organs of the Federal Government free of headache over the existence of seeming constitutional basis for its partial or complete destruction by Congressional decree. Together
with limitations on Congressional power to circumscribe vertical
constitutional review that are deducible from historical events of
1787-1789, this view would restrict Congressional intervention to
constructive legislative measures, akin to those now resident in
28 U. S. C., deemed necessary and proper to the most satisfactory
effectuation of constitutional, as well as judicial, review.

